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BEWARE THE TRADEMARK ECHO CHAMBER:
WHY FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD NOT
DEFER TO USPTO DECISIONS
Deborah R. Gerhardt†

ABSTRACT
This Article explains why federal courts should not defer to United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) trademark decisions. Under United States trademark law, actual
use of a mark on specific goods or services is required to support federal trademark
registration. The USPTO processes a tremendous volume of applications to register
trademarks. In order to do so expeditiously, trademark examiners use heuristics drawn from
past USPTO registration data. While markets continually change, each trademark registration
is updated at five or ten-year renewal intervals. Accordingly, much of the data does not reflect
current market use. A recent audit established that many federal trademark registrations would
be cancelled if their factual foundations were challenged. In stark contrast, courts examine
market evidence in evaluating the core trademark issues of use, validity, and availability.
Examining the factual context of each mark is especially important because, unlike other forms
of intellectual property, trademarks have no fixed duration. They are functions of market use.
Over time, trademark rights may shrink, be forfeited or expand and last indefinitely as use and
public perceptions change. If courts apply de novo review to Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board (TTAB) decisions, they will ensure that a forum remains for trademark decisions to be
adjudicated based on facts, instead of shortcuts, and current, not past, understandings. While
the USPTO does have significant trademark expertise, it does not have the authority to
consider Constitutional limits on trademark protection. As seen in the administrative history
of the “SLANTS” mark, the USPTO does not adjudicate whether trademark registration
decisions violate constitutional rights. Too much deference to the USPTO could result in a
trademark echo chamber where litigants never have the opportunity for a court to examine
the entire factual record or consider how trademark decisions impact expressive speech. For
all of these reasons, federal courts should review USPTO trademark decisions de novo to
preserve the opportunity for adjudication based on genuine fact-finding and an openness to
modes of inquiry in addition to trademark law.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Federal judges may be tempted to defer to administrative findings on
trademark matters. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
employs hundreds of lawyers who spend all their professional time on
trademark law and policy. Their expertise on trademark matters is substantial,
and at first glance, it may seem to be reason enough to defer to their decisions.
A prominent scholar asserted that administrative law doctrine supports giving
USPTO decisions greater deference than they are currently accorded. 1 But
before doing so, there are important counterarguments to consider.
This Article identifies four reasons why federal courts should be
particularly cautious about deferring to USPTO trademark decisions. First,
administrative law supports de novo review. Second, the USPTO routinely
uses heuristics drawn from the Principal Register in place of evidence of actual
market use. Before deferring to a USPTO decision in any particular matter,

1. See generally Melissa F. Wasserman, What Administrative Law Can Teach the Trademark
System, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1511 (2016).
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federal courts should consider whether the USPTO examined evidence of
market use before rendering their decision. Third, trademark rights can change
dramatically over time. Most forms of intellectual property, like patents,
copyrights, and rights of publicity, have set linear terms of protection and then
move into the public domain. Trademarks are different. They can move in and
out of protectable status as market uses and language evolve. A trademark, if
carefully curated as a source identifying symbol, can last forever. But it is also
possible for a mark owner to lose trademark rights at any time if the mark is
abandoned or ceases to signal commercial distinctiveness. Fourth, while the
USPTO has significant trademark experience, it lacks expertise on other issues,
such as market analysis, lexicography, economics, and First Amendment
expressive rights, which are often implicated in trademark matters.
This Article proceeds in five parts. After summarizing the trademark
registration process in Part II, the discussion proceeds through the four
reasons why federal courts should apply de novo review to USPTO decisions.
Part III challenges the assertion that administrative law supports greater
deference to USPTO decisions. It sets forth multiple ways in which
administrative law doctrine supports de novo review of USPTO decisions. Part
IV identifies the heuristics that the USPTO uses in place of market evidence
to examine the fundamental questions of trademark use, distinctiveness, and
likelihood of confusion. All of these issues raise fact-intensive questions that
the USPTO lacks the time and resources to address. The USPTO processes a
tremendous volume of applications. In order to do so expeditiously, trademark
examiners are instructed to use evidentiary heuristics in place of actual facts.
These heuristics may lead to overprotection of some marks resulting in
underprotection for new entrants engaged in bona fide use. These results may
then be affirmed without genuine fact-finding by the USPTO’s administrative
court, known as the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB).
Part V explains how trademark protection is fundamentally different from
other forms of intellectual property that may be lost due to expiration or
disclosure. While trademark rights can be lost as well, they can also expand or
contract over time as use and public perception change. The dynamic nature
of trademarks and the forward-looking nature of the likelihood of confusion
standard mean that the doctrine has built-in flexibility meant to permit
reconsideration of past predictive conclusions. This flexibility provides
additional room for courts to avoid deference to past administrative decisions
and, instead, to conduct independent de novo review.
Finally, Part VI analyzes whether the USPTO’s significant trademark
expertise justifies deference. While the USPTO has extensive expertise in
trademark law, it lacks expertise in other disciplines that protect expressive
interests and inform how consumers perceive symbols. Too much deference
could result in decisions from a trademark echo chamber. Federal court
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intervention may be necessary to protect expressive interests that are often
entwined in trademark matters. The Federal Circuit and Supreme Court
decisions overturning the TTAB’s refusal to register “THE SLANTS” mark
illustrate the important role that federal courts play in assuring that trademark
issues are not extinguished by decision-makers who lack authority to consider
First Amendment rights.2 For all of the foregoing reasons, Part VII concludes
that as currently constructed, the practice of de novo federal court review
ensures that there is a forum for trademark decisions to be made based on
genuine fact-finding and an openness to modes of inquiry outside of trademark
law.
II.

THE USPTO’S TRADEMARK REGISTRATION SYSTEM

The Trademark division of the USPTO reviews applications for federal
trademark protection.3 Successful applicants are granted federal registration.
The USPTO administers two official trademark registries: the Principal and
Supplemental Registers. The Principal Register confers superior statutory
benefits.4 A principal registration gives the mark owner exclusive nationwide
rights to use the mark on the goods and services identified in the application.5
Even if a brand owner is not using its mark in every state, the registration
empowers the owner to stop later adopters from using the mark once the
owner enters their regions.6 The registration certificate constitutes prima facie
evidence that the mark is valid and owned by the applicant.7 After a mark is
on the Principal Register for five years, it may become “incontestable” if its
owner indicates it is still in use on the identified goods and services.8 Once
incontestable status is secured, the registration may be renewed indefinitely

2. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (affirming the Federal Circuit’s en
banc reversal of the TTAB decision denying registration of “THE SLANTS” because the
statute barring registration of disparaging marks violated the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution).
3. For a more detailed description of the trademark registration process, see generally
Deborah R. Gerhardt & Jon P. McClanahan, Do Trademark Lawyers Matter?, 16 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 583 (2013).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 1094 (2012).
5. See id. § 1057(c) (“[T]he filing of the application to register such mark shall constitute
constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority, nationwide in effect, on or in
connection with the goods or services specified in the registration against any other
person . . . .”).
6. See generally Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959)
(holding that “§ 1072 affords nationwide protection to registered marks, regardless of the area
in which the registrant actually uses the mark”).
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b).
8. Id. § 1065.
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every ten years. 9 An incontestable registration constitutes “conclusive
evidence” of the mark’s validity and the information in the registration
certificate. 10 Incontestable status does not prevent the mark from being
challenged, but it limits the grounds on which a cancellation claim may be
asserted.11
When seeking to register a trademark, an applicant must demonstrate that
the mark is used in commerce, is commercially distinctive of goods and
services, and is not barred by statute. Applicants must verify, under oath, the
date when they began using the mark in commerce and the goods or services
used in connection with the mark.12 Applicants must also provide at least one
specimen that shows the use of the mark in commerce.13
Proof of distinctiveness is another threshold requirement.14 A mark will be
found distinctive if it signals to consumers that the product or service
originates from a particular source. The Supreme Court stated that, “[a]n
identifying mark is distinctive and capable of being protected if it either (1) is
inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness through secondary
meaning.”15 A mark may be placed on the less desirable Supplemental Register
if it is not yet distinctive but is capable of acquiring commercially distinctive
meaning. 16 When, for example, an applicant cannot establish that its
descriptive phrase has earned consumer recognition as a mark, it may still
obtain a place on the Supplemental Register. 17 If the phrase ever acquires
distinctiveness, also known as “secondary meaning,” the applicant may reapply
for acceptance on the Principal Register.18
Even if a mark is used in a way that it is distinctive, the USPTO will not
register the mark if it is barred by Section 2 of the Lanham Act, the federal
statute governing trademark law. The USPTO “must register sourceidentifying trademarks unless the mark falls into one of several categories of
marks precluded from registration.”19 Section 2 lists bars to registration.20 For

9. See id. § 1058.
10. Id. § 1115.
11. Id. §§ 1064(3), 1065.
12. See id. § 1051. Applications based on a bona fide intent to use a mark must provide
proof of use before the mark will be registered.
13. See id.
14. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 11:70 (5th ed. 2018).
15. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) (emphasis in original).
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 1091.
17. See id. § 1095.
18. See id.
19. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), aff’d sub
nom. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)–(e).
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example, Section 2(a) prohibits registration of words that are deceptive. Under
this provision, the TTAB denied an application to register “MARC
CHAGALL” for vodka because it falsely suggested a connection to the famous
painter.21 More typically, applications are denied based on Section 2(d) which
bars the registration of a new mark if it is confusingly similar to one already on
the Principal Register.
A USPTO attorney reviews each trademark application. If the application
is defective in any way, the examining attorney may issue an office action
specifying the problem. Most applicants must overcome at least one office
action before a mark will be successfully registered.22 Within six months of the
date on which the office action is issued, the applicant must respond by
amending the application or submitting evidence and arguments rebutting the
examiner’s concerns. 23 When all such issues are resolved, the examining
attorney will approve the application, and the mark will be published in the
USPTO’s Official Gazette.24 Publication indicates that all USPTO objections
have been overcome, but it opens a second window of vulnerability. After
publication, third parties who think they may be harmed by the registration
have thirty days to file an opposition proceeding.25 Oppositions are adjudicated
by the USPTO’s TTAB. If no opposition is filed, the application will be
admitted to the Principal Register.26
All registered marks (and applications) are published and easily found by
an Internet search in the USPTO’s Trademark Electronic Search System
(TESS) database. In the examination process, the USPTO examiners search
TESS to see whether an applicant’s mark may lead to confusion with a mark
that is already registered. Trademark examiners are very adept at finding
confusing similarities and will not admit new marks for registration if they are
likely to cause confusion with marks registered earlier. A recent empirical study
documents that refusals based on a likelihood of confusion are occurring with
greater frequency. 27 In this way, the USPTO is becoming an increasingly
important partner in policing the boundaries of registered trademarks. Live
registrations also provide their owners with meaningful deterrent value. New

21. See generally Ass’n pour la Defense et la Promotion de L’oeuvre de Marc Chagall Dite
Comite Marc Chagall v. Bondarchuk, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1838 (T.T.A.B. 2007).
22. See Gerhardt & McClanahan, supra note 3, at 615.
23. 37 C.F.R. § 2.62 (2015).
24. See Gerhardt & McClanahan, supra note 3, at 590.
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (2012).
26. If the mark has not yet been used in commerce, the applicant will receive a “Notice
of Allowance” and registration will occur after the applicant demonstrates that it has begun
using the mark in commerce.
27. See Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An
Empirical Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945, 1003–12 (2018).
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entrants familiar with the USPTO registration process search the registries
before selecting marks because they know the USPTO may deny registration
based on section 2(d) if an applicant puts forward a mark that may be deemed
similar to one that is already registered.
Applicants whose marks are refused registration may appeal to the
TTAB.28 These appeals are generally conducted through written testimony and
arguments, but parties may request a live oral argument.29 TTAB decisions may
be appealed directly to the Federal Circuit or any federal district court with
jurisdiction over the dispute. 30 In litigation, federal judges may also review
TTAB registration decisions made by examiners. Once a federal court is asked
to review a USPTO trademark decision, the judiciary must identify the
appropriate standard for reviewing the administrative trademark decision. The
next Section sets forth important considerations for determining the
appropriate standard of review.
III.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE TO USPTO TRADEMARK DECISIONS

When a federal court defers to an administrative agency’s decision, it
adopts a decision that it may not have made independently.31 Professor Melissa
Wasserman has written an excellent article that sets forth reasons why federal
courts should review USPTO decisions with greater deference.32 The goal of
this Article is to provide a counterbalance. It is meant to be read alongside
hers, and therefore, any arguments that may support greater deference are not
rearticulated. Instead, this Article sets forth the reasons courts should not defer

28. See 15 U.S.C. § 1070.
29. TBMP 702.03 (2018) (“Because the Board is an administrative tribunal, its rules and
procedures differ in some respects from those prevailing in the federal district courts . . . . For
example, in lieu of live testimony, proceedings before the Board are conducted in writing, and
the Board’s actions in a particular case are based on the written record therein. The Board
does not preside at the taking of testimony. Rather, all testimony is taken out of the presence
of the Board, by affidavit or declaration, or on oral examination or written questions, and the
affidavits, declarations and written deposition transcripts, together with any exhibits thereto,
are then submitted to the Board.”); id. at 802.02 (permitting either party to a proceeding to
request an oral hearing).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1071.
31. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and
Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 665 (2000) (“Judicial deference
acknowledges that . . . a court might arrive at a conclusion different from one it would
otherwise reach.”); Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 643, 652 (2015) (defining deference “to include any situation in which a second
decisionmaker is influenced by the judgment of some initial decisionmaker rather than
examining an issue entirely de novo”).
32. See generally Wasserman, supra note 1.
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to USPTO trademark decisions.
Federal courts have not reached a consensus on the standard of review
they should apply to USPTO trademark decisions. 33 Occasionally, federal
courts have concluded it is appropriate to defer to the USPTO’s trademark
expertise on interpretations of the Lanham Act. 34 More often, the federal
judiciary accords less deference, reviewing the decisions as “persuasive, but not
controlling” or “entitled to respect” due to the USPTO’s trademark
expertise.35 Many other courts apply no deference at all and review USPTO
decisions independently under a de novo standard.36
Given the substantial trademark experience at the USPTO, federal courts
may be tempted to defer to agency expertise. Before doing so, they should
note that administrative law doctrine provides a sound basis for declining to
exercise such deference. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) sets default
rules to unify federal agency procedures and the extent to which federal courts
may review agency decisions.37 Unless Congress enacts legislation specifying
the appropriate standard of review for an agency’s decisions, the APA dictates
the standard of review that federal courts should apply.38 The federal patent
statutes do not specify the standard of review that courts should apply when
reviewing USPTO decisions. In Dickensen v. Zurko, the Supreme Court clarified
that the APA sets the standards of review for judicial consideration of USPTO
patent decisions.39

33. See id. at 1556–57.
34. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co., 994 F.2d
1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
35. See, e.g., Kelly Services, Inc. v. Creative Harbor, LLC, 846 F.3d 857, 879 n.1 (6th Cir.
2017) (citing Rosenruist-Gestao E Servicios LDA v. Virgin Enters. Ltd., 511 F.3d 437, 459–
60 (4th Cir. 2007); Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 412 F.3d 373, 382 (2d Cir. 2005)
(citing TTAB decisions); Enrique Bernat F., S.A. v. Guadalajara, Inc., 210 F.3d 439, 443 (5th
Cir. 2000); Gruma Corp. v. Mex. Restaurants, Inc., 497 F. App’x. 392, 396 n.1 (5th Cir. 2012)
(collecting cases treating TTAB decisions as persuasive authority).
36. See, e.g., Aktieselskabet AF November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 13
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (explaining that a district court “decides de novo whether the application at
issue should proceed to registration, or the registration involved should be canceled, or
“such other matter as the issues in the proceeding require, as the facts in the case may
appear”); Swatch AG v. Beehive Wholesale, LLC, 739 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding
that “the district court reviews the record de novo and acts as the finder of fact”); ProFootball, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 452 (E.D. Va. 2015), vacated on other
grounds, 709 F. App’x 182 (4th Cir. 2018) (“Where a party to such an action exercises its
right to supplement the TTAB record, the Court gives no deference to
the TTAB’s findings.”).
37. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012).
38. Dickensen v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999).
39. Id.
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Like federal patent law, the Lanham Act contains no provision specifying
the standard of review for USPTO trademark decisions.40 Following Dickenson,
one would expect the APA to govern the level of deference federal courts
should afford to USPTO trademark decisions. 41 The APA sets forth three
standards federal courts may use in reviewing administrative decisions on
questions of law: the “must defer” Chevron standard, the “may defer” Skidmore
review, or the “no deference” standard of de novo review.42 Under the Chevron
standard, courts must defer to reasonable agency decisions, especially when
the agency has particular expertise over a “regulatory scheme [that is] technical
and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned
fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.”43 Under the
Skidmore standard, although agency decisions are not controlling, courts may
defer to agency expertise because their decisions “constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment.”44 When Chevron deference applies, the
reviewing court substitutes the agency’s findings for its own, and when
Skidmore deference applies, the court may lean heavily on the agency’s
interpretation. In stark contrast, courts that apply de novo review make
independent findings of fact and conclusions of law.45
Professor Melissa Wasserman asserts that Chevron deference should be
given to USPTO decisions on questions of trademark law.46 Notwithstanding
this general assertion and the normative hopes for a future USPTO with
greater resources and evolved expertise, her central claim with respect to
deference is narrow. Initial registration decisions constitute the vast majority

40. See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1527–29.
41. Dickensen, 527 U.S. at 152.
42. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1529.
43. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44, 865 (1984) (holding that
“[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a
particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency”).
44. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
45. Swatch AG v. Beehive Wholesale, LLC, 739 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding
that federal district courts have “authority independent of the PTO to grant or cancel
registrations and to decide any related matters such as infringement and unfair competition
claims.” 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1). The district court must admit the PTO record if a party so
moves, and if admitted, the record “shall have the same effect as if originally taken and
produced in the suit.” Id. at § 1071(b)(3). Whether or not the record is admitted, the parties
have an unrestricted right to submit further evidence as long as it is admissible under the
Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure.).
46. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1539.
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of the USPTO’s trademark work. Professor Wasserman concedes that federal
courts should afford no deference to registration decisions made by trademark
examiners.47 However, in her judgment, a subset of registration appeals do
warrant deference. She asserts that the best candidates are the subset of
decisions that the TTAB expressly designates as precedential. 48 Some
precedential decisions are appealed to the Federal Circuit, and Professor
Wasserman concludes that Skidmore deference, or more provocatively Chevron
deference, should be applied.49 She concedes that if the applicant chose to
instead appeal the decision to a federal district court, deference would not be
appropriate because “[i]f new evidence is presented that informs the
underlying legal determination, then the district court should make de novo
factual findings and legal determinations. In this circumstance, the district court
is not acting as a reviewing court, as envisioned by the APA, but instead as a
tribunal of first impression.”50
Notwithstanding Wasserman’s arguments in favor of deference for
precedential TTAB decisions appealed to the Federal Circuit, administrative
law doctrine provides reasons not to apply Chevron or Skidmore deference to
any USPTO trademark decisions. The deferential Chevron standard requires
federal courts to defer to agency interpretations on ambiguous questions of
law that are based on a “reasonable” construction of the statute.51 In United
States v. Mead, the Supreme Court clarified that Chevron deference should be
applied only if Congress delegated formal rule-making power or formal
adjudication authority to the agency.52 The USPTO possesses neither of the
two formal powers that trigger Chevron deference.
The USPTO does not have formal rule-making authority. In the patent
context, the Federal Circuit held that the USPTO may enact only procedural
rules and does not have the substantive rule-making authority required to


47. See id. at 1526.
48. Id. at 1539. Only decisions that TTAB identified as “precedential” are considered
binding on the board. All other decisions may be considered as persuasive authority but are
not binding. TBMP § 101.03 (June 2017) (clarifying that TTAB decisions are citable as
precedent only if they are “designated by the Board ‘citable as precedent,’ ‘precedent of the
Board,’ ‘precedent of the TTAB,’ or ‘for publication in full’ . . . . Decisions which are not so
designated, or which are designated for publication only in digest form, are not binding on the
Board, but may be cited for whatever persuasive weight to which they may be entitled.
Decisions of other tribunals may be cited to the extent allowed and for the purposes permitted
by the tribunal that issued the decision”).
49. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1547.
50. Id. at 1545.
51. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
52. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
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trigger Chevron deference.53 Similarly, the trademark side of the USPTO has
only procedural authority.54 Professor Wasserman concedes that the USPTO
“does not possess the power to issue binding rules that carry the force of law
on the core issues of trademark law.”55
Even without formal rule-making authority, Chevron deference may be
appropriate when agencies are given formal adjudication authority. 56
Adjudications “involve determinations of contested facts in applying rules to
specific circumstances.”57 By definition, adjudications require examination of
contested facts. Therefore, it is important to examine whether the USPTO
trademark registration process involves genuine fact-finding. As set forth in
Part IV, the USPTO uses a series of administrative shortcuts in place of market
evidence in making trademark registration decisions. Given these routine
practices, it would be inaccurate to describe the USPTO’s trademark
registration process as formal adjudication.
Congress knows how to assign final adjudication authority to agencies so
that the agency’s decisions will be accorded Chevron deference. Typically, when
Congress decides to give an agency formal adjudication authority, it says so by
expressly using words such as “on the record” to clarify that the agency’s
proceedings involve the type of fact finding one would experience in court.58
Professor Wasserman concedes that the typical words Congress uses to grant
formal adjudicatory authority do not appear in the Lanham Act.59 That absence
makes sense because Congress explicitly provided for trademark registration
decisions to be fully litigated in federal district court.60

53. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Because Congress
has not vested the Commissioner with any general substantive rulemaking power . . . the rule
of controlling deference set forth in Chevron does not apply” to most PTO regulations, which
are procedural in nature).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1123 (2012) (“The Director shall make rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office under this
chapter.”) (emphasis added).
55. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1534.
56. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226–27.
57. See United States v. Indep. Bulk Transp., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 474, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(citing United States v. Florida E. C. R. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 244-45 (1973); Int’l Tel. & Tel.
Corp. v. Local 134, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 419 U.S. 428 (1975)).
58. Melissa M. Berry, Beyond Chevron’s Domain: Agency Interpretations of Statutory Procedural
Provisions, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 541, 551–52 (2007) (explaining that although the Supreme
Court never had a bright-lined rule, “no one would dispute that formal procedures should be
required if the enabling statute includes ‘on the record’ language . . . many states require some
sort of ‘hearing’ . . .”).
59. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1537.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) (2012).
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The APA provides that de novo review is appropriate when there is a
statutory guarantee of a new trial. 61 It states that the reviewing court shall
decide all questions of law and set aside any agency findings of facts when “the
facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.”62 This is exactly the
scenario that the Lanham Act created so that all examination and TTAB
decisions may be fully relitigated in federal district court.63
Commentators and courts agree that when new evidence is presented in
federal district court, the TTAB’s findings of fact must be reviewed de novo.64
When no new evidence is offered, federal courts have debated the appropriate
standard for reviewing USPTO’s findings of fact. Some courts state that they
defer to facts found by the USPTO if they are supported by “substantial
evidence.”65 Professor Wasserman argues that the more deferential “arbitrary
or capricious” standard should be applied when a TTAB decision is appealed
to the Federal Circuit or when no new facts are before a federal district court.66
Under this standard, the reviewing court may not substitute its view for that
of the agency’s and may overturn an agency’s findings of fact only if the agency
committed clear error in applying the relevant factors.67 Some have argued that
the two standards have no meaningful difference. 68 Others assert that no
deference is appropriate beyond acknowledging the prima facie validity of the
facts in a registration certificate. Some courts take a hybrid approach, using the
“substantial evidence” standard unless the mark owner asserts new evidence,
at which point the standard becomes de novo.69 The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held:
In none of these provisions conferring on federal courts the power
to adjudicate rights under the Lanham Act does Congress instruct


61. Id. § 706(2)(f).
62. Id.
63. See id. § 1071.
64. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1545 (“If new evidence is presented that informs
the underlying legal determination, then the district court should make de novo factual
findings and legal determinations.”); Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1700 (2012).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(e) (2012); Am. Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 817
(4th Cir. 2001).
66. See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1558.
67. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
68. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1550, n.178 (citing, inter alia, then-Judge Scalia’s opinion
in Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745
F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
69. See Pro-Football, Inc., v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 102 (2003) (“[T]he Court reviews
the findings of fact of the TTAB under the substantial evidence test, which has been derived
from the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706. Additionally, the parties are
permitted to offer new evidence, and the Court may make new findings of fact based on this
newly submitted evidence.”).
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the courts to review registration decisions of the PTO under a
deferential standard. To the contrary, Congress “has directly
spoken” on this issue, specifying a more limited standard: the agency
action is “prima facie evidence” of specified facts, and no more.70

It is this last view that makes the most sense, given the USPTO’s limited
ability to engage in fact-finding. De novo review of TTAB decisions in federal
court was expressly put into the Lanham Act to assure that trademark litigants
would have a forum to present all operative facts. A leading administrative law
treatise confirms that de novo review is the appropriate standard when “fact
finding is essential and the agency has inadequate procedures for fact
finding.”71
De novo review of USPTO trademark decision-making is necessary to
provide an opportunity for genuine fact-finding. In Kappos v. Hyatt, the
Supreme Court unanimously held that when a patent litigant appeals a USPTO
decision to a federal district court, they are entitled to “a de novo
determination with respect to any issue of fact.”72 The Court explained that
“where new evidence is presented to the district court on a disputed fact
question, a de novo finding will be necessary to take such evidence into
account together with the evidence before the board.”73 Although the Kappos
decision addressed questions of patent law, the Supreme Court’s clarification
on the standard of review to accord USPTO patent decisions should apply to
the agency’s trademark decisions as well.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly applied the Kappos
reasoning to a USPTO trademark decision, stating that when new evidence is
submitted, de novo review is required because the district court “cannot
meaningfully defer to the PTO’s factual findings if the PTO considered a
different set of facts.” 74 The major issues of use, distinctiveness, and
availability that the USPTO decides for purposes of registration are all factintensive.75 As set forth in Part IV, the USPTO uses a host of administrative
rules of thumb in place of actual market evidence to make these factual
determinations. Federal district court provides a genuine forum for a full
factual review of the record not replicated by the USPTO. In order to assure
that the trademark litigants have some opportunity to present all operative

70. Am. Online, Inc., 243 F.3d at 817.
71. See KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 11.4 (5th ed., 2018 Cum. Supp. 2010).
72. See id. § 15.2.
73. Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1700 (2012).
74. Swatch AG v. Beehive Warehouse, LLC, 739 F.3d 150, 156 (2014) (citing Kappos, 132
S. Ct. at 1700).
75. See id. at 155 (discussing likelihood of dilution and likelihood of confusion as factintensive).
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facts, courts should not defer to factual determinations made by the USPTO.
Policy concerns about inefficiency raise additional questions about
whether deference is advisable, even if it is not required. The Lanham Act does
not require trademark owners to exhaust administrative remedies before
litigating trademark validity or infringement questions in court.76 Congress also
did not provide the USPTO with primary jurisdiction over trademark
registrations. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction “is concerned with
promoting the proper relationships between the courts and administrative
agencies charged with particular regulatory duties.”77 The doctrine provides
that federal courts should suspend proceedings “whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have
been placed within the special competence of an administrative body.” 78
Congress expressly provided that either the TTAB or the courts could consider
trademark registration issues; therefore, neither has primary jurisdiction.79 To
the extent the questions overlap, either proceeding may be delayed pending a
resolution of the other.80
A federal court has the discretion to stay its proceedings pending USPTO
review. A stay is most appropriate when only registration issues are before the
federal court.81 In the interest of judicial economy, “the case for permitting the
PTO to proceed first is bolstered where the PTO adjudication might serve as
a final disposition of the matter, making further trial court proceedings
unnecessary.” 82 When courts hear trademark cases that involve more than
registration decisions, the argument for deferring to the USPTO is less
compelling.83 Given the robust fact-finding abilities of courts and the broader
issues often presented in trademark litigation, courts may find that “it is

76. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1) (2012); Rhoades v. Avon Prod., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1164 (9th
Cir. 2007) (“Congress has not installed the PTO as the exclusive expert in the field. As noted,
parties may litigate these issues in federal court without previously exhausting their claims
before the TTAB.”).
77. United States v. W. Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956).
77. Id. at 64.
79. Am. Bakeries Co. v. Pan-O-Gold Co., 650 F. Supp. 563, 565–68 (D. Minn. 1986).
80. See Rhoades, 504 F.3d at 1163–64 (refusing to stay litigation pending registration
proceedings); Calista Enters. Ltd. v. Tenza Trading Ltd., 2013 WL 6080184 (denying motion
to stay); Hanginout, Inc. v. Google, No.13cv2811 AJB (NLS), 2015 WL 11254689 (S.D. Cal.
June 2, 2015) (denying motion to stay); Vina Casa Tamaya S.A. v. Oakville Hills Cellar, Inc.,
784 F. Supp. 2d 391, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (granting motion to dismiss because the “dispute
can properly be resolved in the TTAB proceeding already underway”).
81. Rhoades, 504 F.3d at 1164.
82. Am. Bakeries, 650 F. Supp. at 567 (citing Driving Force, Inc. v. Manpower, Inc., 498
F. Supp. 21, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Kemin Indus., Inc. v. Watkins Prods., Inc., 183 U.S.P.Q. 799
(D. Minn. 1974)).
83. Rhoades, 504 F.3d at 1164.
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preferable for the TTAB to stay its own proceedings where parallel litigation
occurs in the district court.”84 Decades of such precedent have led litigants and
TTAB judges to rely on the possibility that questions of fact and law may be
relitigated in federal court if the parties are dissatisfied with the results before
the TTAB.85
The Supreme Court’s recent consideration of issue preclusion in B & B
Hardware v. Hargis Industries is consistent with maintaining de novo review.86
The story of the case illustrates the anti-competitive effects that can result from
deferring to administrative heuristics. Because it left unchallenged an
administrative decision, Hargis ended up being stuck with a loss that conflicted
with two wins it had litigated in federal court. The story of how that happened
began in 1993, when B&B registered “SEALTIGHT” for fasteners used in the
aerospace industry.87 The previous year, Hargis began using “SEALTITE” for
screws used in the construction industry.88 The companies’ products did not
compete. Nonetheless, B&B sued Hargis for trademark infringement.89 Hargis
responded by petitioning the USPTO to cancel B&B’s registration, but that
proceeding was stayed pending resolution of the litigation in federal court.90
At trial, Hargis proved that B&B’s mark was descriptive without secondary
meaning, and therefore, not sufficiently distinctive to merit federal trademark
registration.91 Based on the verdict, Hargis should have obtained a judgment
cancelling B&B’s federal registration. “[N]either the district court, nor the
court of appeals that affirmed the ruling, ordered the PTO to cancel the


84. Sonora Cosmetics, Inc. v. L’Oreal S.A., 631 F. Supp. 626, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing
The Other Tel. Co. v. Connecticut Nat’l Tel. Co., 181 U.S.P.Q. 779, 782 (Com’r
1974)), aff’d, 795 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.1986); Am. Bakeries Co., 650 F. Supp. at 568 (denying
motion to stay litigation pending the USPTO proceedings).
85. See, e.g., Swatch AG v. Beehive LLC, 739 F.3d 150 (after the TTAB found that
“SWAP” for watch parts did not infringe “SWATCH” for watches, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed that although “the TTAB applies a different standard for actual confusion, the
district court properly found on a de novo review of the record” that no infringement or
dilution liability was substantiated by the record); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 709 F.
App’x 182, 183 (4th Cir. 2018) (directing the district court to reconsider its affirmance of the
TTAB’s ordered cancellation of the “REDSKINS” registrations based on 1052(a)); Specialty
Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distribs., 748 F.2d 669, 671 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (reversing the
TTAB’s decision finding no likelihood of confusion between “SPICE ISLANDS” and
“SPICE VALLEY” marks for tea).
86. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015).
87. Id. at 1301.
88. SEALTITE, Registration No. 1,797,509 (no longer registered).
89. B&B Hardware, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1301.
90. Id. at 1302.
91. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 569 F.3d 383, 388 (8th Cir. 2009).
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registration, despite that registration’s invalidity.”92
After the trial, the TTAB lifted the stay on the cancellation proceeding,
and Hargis sought to amend its claim to assert that B&B’s mark lacked
distinctiveness based on the trial court’s finding that the mark was descriptive
without secondary meaning.93 The motion was denied because, by then, B&B’s
mark had been sitting on the Principal Register long enough to become
incontestable, and therefore, the TTAB concluded that it could no longer be
challenged as merely descriptive.94
Hargis then applied to register “SEALTITE” for use with fasteners in the
construction industry.95 The TTAB found that “SEALTITE” might lead to
confusion with B&B’s registered mark and refused to register Hargis’s mark.96
Hargis did not appeal this decision. While the registration challenges were
pending before the USPTO, B&B sued Hargis again for infringement, and
again, Hargis won on the merits. This time, the district court found that
Hargis’s mark was not confusingly similar.97 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
held that Hargis’s failure to appeal the TTAB decision resulted in issue
preclusion because “the usages adjudicated by the TTAB are materially the
same as those before the district court.”98
The Supreme Court was careful to cabin its holding to situations in which
there was identical evidence and legal interpretation. The result could have
been easily avoided if Hargis had secured cancellation of the B&B mark in the
first round of litigation, or if Hargis had appealed the TTAB decision instead
of assuming it could not have preclusive effect. The Supreme Court expressly
stated that the Hargis saga was not the norm, and that the holding should not
apply when the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are absent.99 The Court
explained:
Although many registrations will not satisfy those ordinary elements,
that does not mean that none will. We agree with Professor
McCarthy that issue preclusion applies where “the issues in the two
cases are indeed identical and the other rules of collateral estoppel


92. Rebecca Tushnet, Fixing Incontestability: The Next Frontier, 43 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
434, 441 (2017).
93. Sealtite Building Fasteners v. B&B Hardware, Inc., No. 92026016 (T.T.A.B. June 13,
2003).
94. SEALTITE, Registration No. 1,797,509 (no longer registered).
95. B&B Hardware, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1301.
96. Id. at 1302.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1310.
99. Id. at 1306.


2018]

BEWARE THE TRADEMARK ECHO CHAMBER

659

are carefully observed.100

Justice Ginsburg joined the majority opinion and wrote a four-sentence
concurrence to emphasize that TTAB decisions should not have preclusive
effect when they rely on unsubstantiated claims in the Principal Register and
not evidence of market use.101 Justice Ginsburg wrote,
The Court rightly recognizes that “for a great many registration
decisions issue preclusion obviously will not apply.” That is so
because contested registrations are often decided upon “a
comparison of the marks in the abstract and apart from their
marketplace usage.” When the registration proceeding is of that
character, “there will be no preclusion of the likelihood of confusion
issue . . . in a later infringement suit.” On that understanding, I join
the Court’s opinion.102

The Supreme Court’s discussion in Hargis suggests multiple reasons why it
would not affirm heightened deference to TTAB decisions. In deciding Hargis,
the Supreme Court expressly mentioned the de novo standard, explaining that
the “importance of registration is undoubtedly why Congress provided for de
novo review of TTAB decisions in district court.”103 The majority also made it
clear that when the Principal Register does not match actual market use, issue
preclusion should not apply.104 The Court applied issue preclusion in Hargis
after finding that the market uses were “materially the same” as those set forth
in the Principal Register, but it cautioned that such a result would be
inappropriate where the market and Register did not match. 105 The Court
noted that “if a mark owner uses its mark in ways that are materially unlike the
usages in its application, then the TTAB is not deciding the same issue.”106
Thus, if the TTAB does not consider the marketplace use of the parties’ marks,
the TTAB’s decision should “have no later preclusive effect in a suit where
actual usage in the marketplace is the paramount issue.”107
As set forth in more detail below, it is common USPTO practice to use
unsubstantiated claims in the registry in place of market evidence. The next
Part demonstrates why federal courts should be especially cautious about
deferring to USPTO findings of fact. For the sake of efficiency, examiners
often approximate actual market presence through heuristics when making




100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. at 1310.
Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id.
See id. at 1308.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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trademark registration decisions. For this reason, de novo review in federal
court is important to assure that trademark owners have access to a forum that
will fully adjudicate registration decisions.
IV.

THE USPTO USES HEURISTICS TO EFFICIENTLY
REVIEW ITS GROWING VOLUME OF TRADEMARK
APPLICATIONS

The USPTO trademark examination process is a model of efficiency.
Between 1985 and 2014, the USPTO received 5.9 million applications for a
place on the Principal Register. 108 In 2017, the USPTO employed 549
trademark examiners who were tasked with reviewing 594,107 trademark
applications.109 On average, the 2017 data indicate that examiners spent less
than two hours on each application. 110 In that short window of time, the
examiner determines use, distinctiveness, and whether the mark is available or
likely to be confused with any of the millions of marks on the Principal
Register.111 This task is monumental. To streamline this process, the USPTO
uses several administrative heuristics in place of examining actual evidence of
use, distinctiveness, and availability.
The use of heuristics is not unique to USPTO examiners. It is a necessary
feature of human decision-making. In their ground-breaking work, Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky explain that people cannot possibly process all
available information in making decisions.112 For the sake of efficiency, we use
cognitive short-cuts that Kahneman and Tversky call “heuristics.”113 My use
of the term “heuristics” to describe USPTO practices is different in one
important respect. While the short-cuts, defined by Kahneman and Tversky
and developed by Richard Thaler, Dan Ariely and others, are subconscious,
the administrative heuristics defined here are intentional features of USPTO

108. Beebe & Fromer, supra note 27, at 952 n.22.
109. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
FY17 10, 85 tbl.16, 88 tbl.17, 185 tbl.18 (2018).
110. This rough estimate is based on aggregate data and does not take into account the
experience of examiners or other variables that may affect the time spent on any particular
application. The estimate was based on the following data from the USPTO. Dividing 594,107
applications by 549 examiners results in each examiner reviewing an average of 1082.2
applications. If each examiner had worked fifty weeks per year, each would have reviewed
21.64 applications per week. Assuming a forty-hour work week, each examiner spent an
average of 1.85 hours per application.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (a)(1) (2012).
112. See AMOS TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES, IN JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3 (Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982).
113. Id.
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decision-making.114
In order to process the multitude of applications against its growing
Principal Register, the USPTO manages the registration process by applying
multiple heuristics. These short-cuts and rules of thumb may be essential for
administrative efficiency, but they are not an adequate substitute for genuine
adjudication. For this reason, de novo review of USPTO decisions is important
so that disappointed applicants can get a full hearing before a federal district
judge who can take a genuine and deeper look at the facts.
When examiners make registration decisions, they do their best in the
limited time they have to review proposed marks for use in commerce,
distinctiveness, and availability. An examiner does not have the time or
resources on any of these three fact-intensive questions to gather actual market
evidence that would normally be proffered if these issues were litigated in court.
As explained below, these shortcuts routinely result in decisions that do not
match market reality, and, therefore, should not be afforded deference by
federal courts. If the USPTO rules of thumb and evidentiary short-cuts are
permitted to take the place of actual fact-finding in court, they may lead to
systematic failures to examine facts on many core trademark questions. The
next Section illustrates many points in the registration process where
trademark examiners use heuristics in place of evidence.
A.

USE IN COMMERCE HEURISTICS

Actual use of a distinctive symbol on particular goods or services is an
essential prerequisite to trademark ownership. 115 Unlike patents and
copyrights, trademark rights begin and end with use in commerce. Trademarks
may be protected for the duration and in the field of the use, and they end
when market use ceases. “[A] fundamental tenet of trademark law is that
ownership of an inherently distinctive mark . . . is governed by priority of
use.”116 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that,

114. See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1471 (1998) (applying behavioral economics principles to legal decision-making, the
authors illustrate multiple ways in which subconscious cognitive patterns explain human
decision-making); DANIEL ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT
SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 173 (2008) (illustrating a series of experiments that show how
predicatably irrational subconscious patterns explain human decision-making).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (“The owner of a trademark used in commerce may request
registration of its trademark on the principal register.”); Id. § 1127 (defining “use in commerce”
to require “bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to
reserve a right in a mark”).
116. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1047 (9th Cir.
1999).
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It is axiomatic in trademark law that the standard test of ownership
is priority of use. To acquire ownership of a trademark it is not
enough to have invented the mark first or even to have registered it
first; the party claiming ownership must have been the first to
actually use the mark in the sale of goods or services.117

Before a mark will be registered, an applicant must identify the date on
which it first began using the mark in connection with the claimed goods or
services.118 Under the Lanham Act’s infringement provisions, the first to use a
mark may stop “junior” users of confusingly similar symbols.119 Similarly, the
Lanham Act bars registration of marks that are likely to cause confusion with
marks already on the Principal Register. 120 And finally, when use ends,
trademark rights and registrations should end as well.121
It would be impracticable for the USPTO to verify actual use in commerce
with respect to the millions of currently registered marks and compare them
annually, for likelihood of confusion purposes, to actual use of the hundreds
of thousands of applications for new marks. To make this task manageable,
trademark examiners use USPTO TESS data and quick Internet searches in
place of market evidence.122 The USPTO does collect some evidence of use in
commerce. It requires applicants to submit one specimen showing use of its
mark on a product or service in each international class. 123 Although an
application may claim to use a mark on scores of goods and services in multiple
classes, the USPTO will require the applicant to submit proof of use for only

117. Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC Int’l, Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2).
119. Brookfield Commc’ns, 174 F.3d at 1047; Union Nat’l Bank v. Union Nat’l Bank, 909
F.2d 839, 842–43 (5th Cir. 1990); Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018,
1023 (11th Cir. 1989).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
121. Id. § 1127 (“A mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’ . . . when its use has been
discontinued with intent not to resume such use. Intent not to resume may be inferred from
circumstances. Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment.
‘Use’ of a mark means the bona fide use of such mark made in the ordinary course of trade,
and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.”).
122. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, Searching Marks in USPTO Database,
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/trademark-basics/searching-marksuspto-database [https://perma.cc/NV4W-7KA4] (last visited Nov. 11, 2018) (“This search
engine allows you to search the USPTO’s database of registered trademarks and prior pending
applications to find marks that may prevent registration due to a likelihood of confusion
refusal.”).
123. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.56(a) (“An application under section 1(a) of the Act, an amendment
to allege use under § 2.76, and a statement of use under § 2.88 must each include one specimen
per class showing the mark as used on or in connection with the goods or services. When
requested by the Office as reasonably necessary to proper examination, additional specimens
must be provided.”).
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one item in each class.124 If the application matures to registration, all of the
claimed goods and services are treated as though they were validated by similar
evidence of use. This blanket presumption of validity often gives the mark
owner broad national claims to exclusivity that may not be warranted.
Consequently, the registration may be overbroad in multiple respects.
First, the registration may cover a broad list of goods and services, even if
the mark is used on only a subset of the items identified in the application. The
USPTO considers the applicant’s sworn affidavit as proof of use and applies
that entire statement for the five or ten-year duration of the registration, even
if actual use on all or part of the goods and services never occurred or ended
after the application was filed. General descriptions of goods and services are
presumed to extend trademark rights to all goods and services of the type
described.125 If a new entrant’s goods fall within a broad description in a prior
registration, the USPTO presumes that both parties’ goods “travel in the same
channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” 126 For example, if a
trademark owner describes its goods as “computer programs,” that registration
will block similar marks for all software. Even if a new entrant narrowly defines
its market to clearly indicate its use is so distant from the registrant’s that the
two would not be confused, the prior mark owners’ general description would
block the new application.127 In this way, broad descriptions create substantial
anti-competitive barriers for new applicants.128
The second overbreadth problem is that applicants often face obstacles
from marks that should no longer be on the registry. Registrations may remain

124. See id.; TMEP 1401.02(a) (providing that in 1973, the USPTO adopted the
international classification system established by the Committee of Experts of the Nice Union
and set forth in the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration
of Marks (Nice Classification) published annually by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO)) (The USPTO adopted the forty-five international classes defined at
Nice Classification, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/classifications/
nice/nclpub/en/fr/ [https://perma.cc/W3AQAN8N] (last visited Nov. 11, 2018)).
125. See, e.g., Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1007, 1025
(T.T.A.B. 2015); In re N.A.D., Inc., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1872, 1874 (T.T.A.B. 2000).
126. In re Viterra Inc., 671a F.3d 1358, 1362, (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard
Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
127. See In re Linkvest S.A., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1716 (T.T.A.B. 1992) (where registrant’s
goods are broadly identified as “computer programs recorded on magnetic disks,” without
limitation as to the kind of programs or the field of use, it must be assumed that registrant’s
goods encompass all such computer programs, including computer programs of the type
offered by applicant, that they travel in the same channels of trade normal for such goods, and
that they are available to all classes of prospective purchasers of those goods) (“[W]ith respect
to the goods, the question of likelihood of confusion must be determined on the basis of the
goods set forth in applicant’s application and those in the cited registration, rather than on
what [sic] any evidence may show those goods to be.”).
128. Beebe & Fromer, supra note 27, at 1035.
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in the TESS data long after use of the mark has ended. For a trademark
registration to endure, its owner must file an affidavit confirming continued
use between the fifth and sixth year, and every ten years thereafter.129 One
obvious problem created by the long lag time between renewals is that these
multi-year windows enable registrations to remain alive for years after they are
abandoned. Such “deadwood on the register prevents legitimate users from
knowing what they can and can’t do.”130
A recent USPTO study confirms the severity of this deadwood problem.
In response to concerns that the Principal Register is cluttered with
registrations of abandoned marks, the USPTO launched a pilot audit program
in 2012. 131 The audit’s results unequivocally justified the concerns about
clutter.132 The USPTO selected a statistically significant sample of 500 marks
on the Principal Register and asked each mark owner to verify that it was still
using the mark, and if so, to provide specimens documenting use for all the
claimed goods and services.133 Approximately half of the mark owners did not
submit evidence that they were using the marks as they had claimed in their
registrations.134 As a result of the audit,
172 of the registrations, or 34%, involved deletions of the goods
and/or services queried under the pilot. In another 78 registrations,
or 16%, the trademark owner failed to respond to the requirements
of the pilot and any other issues raised during examination of the
underlying maintenance filing, resulting in cancellation of the
registration . . . of the 500 registrations selected for the pilot . . . 250
registrations, or 50%, were unable . . . to verify the previously
claimed use.135

To continue improving the Principal Register’s integrity, the USPTO made
the pilot auditing program permanent. In doing so, it acknowledged that
registrations for marks
that are not in use on all registered goods and services may
unnecessarily block future applications. They also allow trademark
owners to maintain rights they are not entitled to maintain. Because
removing these registrations or deleting goods or services not in use


129. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1059, 1065 (2012).
130. Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American Trademark
Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867, 869 (2017).
131. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POST REGISTRATION PROOF OF USE
PILOT STATUS REPORT (2015).
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. Id.
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is crucial for maintaining an accurate register, we made the program
permanent.136

The USPTO’s acknowledgement that the Principal Register does not often
mirror use in commerce, resulting in significant overprotection, provides a
strong basis for courts to conduct de novo review of USPTO likelihood of
confusion decisions. Notwithstanding proof that a substantial number of
marks should be narrowed or culled from the Principal Register, the USPTO
is bound by statute to treat all registrations as valid. The Lanham Act provides
that a certificate of federal trademark registration constitutes prima facie
evidence that the owner has an exclusive right to use the mark in connection
with all the goods or services listed in the registration. 137 Once the registration
is affirmed after five years, the mark becomes incontestable, meaning that the
registration is deemed to constitute “conclusive evidence” of the mark’s
validity.138 These terms are a bit misleading. Incontestable marks may still be
contested. As detailed below, some bars, such as mere descriptiveness, are
foreclosed, but incontestable marks remain vulnerable to a number of potential
challenges, including abandonment.139 What is important for federal courts to
note is that in many cases, the federal trademark registration establishes validity
for claims that the mark owner may not be able to support with evidence of
use in commerce. Therefore, the prima facie assumption of validity for
registered marks can be a bubble that is easy to burst.
The USPTO’s treatment of specimens creates a third set of overbreadth
problems related to both use and distinctiveness. For efficiency reasons, the
USPTO requires only one specimen for each item among what might be a very
long list of products or services in each international class.140 Yet, the pilot audit
established that use often cannot be verified. The USPTO has been inundated

136. Post Registration Proof of Use Audit Program, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarksmaintaining-trademark-registration/post-registration-audit-program#Background
[https://perma.cc/AGW7-PLFP] (last visited Nov. 11, 2018); see also 37 C.F.R
§§ 2.161(h), 7.37(h).
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2012) (“A certificate of registration of a mark upon the
principal register provided by this chapter shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the
registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the owner’s ownership of the mark,
and of the owner’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection
with the goods or services specified in the certificate, subject to any conditions or limitations
stated in the certificate.”).
138. Id. § 1115(b).
139. See infra notes 201–217 and accompanying text.
140. 37 C.F.R. § 2.56 (“An application under section 1(a) of the Act, an amendment to
allege use under § 2.76, and a statement of use under § 2.88 must each include one specimen
per class showing the mark as used on or in connection with the goods or services.”).
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with fake or doctored specimens.141 To combat this form of fraud, the USPTO
has initiated a pilot program that permits the public to protest improper
specimens with objective market evidence.142 This audit program will hopefully
help address the USPTO’s concerns that some specimens cannot be supported
by evidence of genuine use in commerce.
A fourth overbreadth issue results from the practice of treating one
element of a brand as an independent mark even if the specimen indicates that
the element is used in connection with more distinctive indicia. An examiner
may permit protection for a color, word, phrase, packaging design, or other
symbol that, in practice, is distinctive only when used in connection with
additional words or other features. The Trademark Manual of Examining
Procedure (TMEP) gives a detailed recipe for finding (or creating) a specimen
that the USPTO will accept. The TMEP states that:
The more prominently an applied-for mark appears on a web page,
the more likely the mark will be perceived as a trademark. A mark
may appear more prominent when the specimen:
x presents the mark in larger font size or different stylization
or color than the surrounding text;
x places the mark at the beginning of a line or sentence;
x positions the mark next to a picture or description of the
goods; or
x uses the “TM” designation with the applied-for mark
(however, the designation alone does not transform a mark
into a trademark if other considerations indicate it does not
function as a trademark).143

Mark owners may assert broad claims in words that follow this formula
and obtain rights for terms that are not genuinely used in the market as an
independent indicator of source. For example, the producers of a courtroom
dramatization known as “We the People with Gloria Allred” asserted
trademark rights in the phrase “WE THE PEOPLE” for use in connection
with a variety of services.144 In addition to the courtroom drama television
services they were actually providing, the application claimed use of the mark

141. Eric J. Perrott, Doctored Trademark Specimens at the USPTO: Analysis of the Plague of
Fake Specimens Threatening to Undermine the Principal Register, 11 LANDSLIDE (2018).
142. TM Specimen Protests Email Pilot Program, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Specimen%20Protests%20Email%2
0Pilot%20Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU82-C3YX].
143. TMEP § 904.03(i)(B)(1).
144. WE THE PEOPLE, Registration No. 4,179,972; WE THE PEOPLE, Registration
No. 4,836,968; WE THE PEOPLE, Registration No. 4,837,090.
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in connection with “providing programs in the field of law.”145 Because the
words “we the people” introduce the preamble of the U.S. Constitution, they
symbolize a unifying American vision of citizenry joined by foundational
principles of law. For this reason, the USPTO should have questioned whether
the applicant developed exclusive rights to the phrase “WE THE PEOPLE”
for all programs related to law.146 The show submitted the following specimen
in support of the application:147

Although the application asserted trademark claims in the phrase “we the
people,” the specimen shows use of the words in a longer phrase that includes
the more commercially distinctive words: “with Gloria Allred.”148 Review of
the specimens should have led the examiner to question whether “we the

145. WE THE PEOPLE, Registration No. 4,179,972.
146. WE THE PEOPLE, Registration No. 4,179,972. The phrase, without any qualifiers,
has also been registered for cigars, firearms, bicycles, and coffee. Registration Nos. 5,241,608
(cigars), 4,140,724 (bicycles), 4,489,575 (firearms), and 4,757,223 (coffee).
147. WE THE PEOPLE, Registration No. 4,179,972 (specimen submitted in color on
April 18, 2018).
148. WE THE PEOPLE, Registration No. 4,179,972; WE THE PEOPLE, Registration
No. 4,836,968; WE THE PEOPLE, Registration No. 4,837,090.
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people” was used independently of other indicia as an independent source
identifier.149 The examiner likely accepted the alleged use because the words
“we the people” followed the rules set forth in the TMEP indicating that use
as a mark is indicated when the claimed mark is depicted in “larger font size
or different stylization or color than the surrounding text.”150 This example
illustrates how literal application of the agency’s guidelines with regard to size
of text and font can lead to overprotection when the guidelines are used in
place of an actual examination of distinctiveness. A more careful review would
have inquired into whether the words “we the people” create a distinct
commercial impression apart from the words “with Gloria Allred.” In one
instance, all six words appear together in the same font. Because another part
of the specimen technically conformed to the TMEP’s guidelines by showing
the claimed mark in a different font, the Applicant secured the registration
without offering any evidence that it uses the ubiquitous American phrase “we
the people” as a distinct and independent mark.151 The file suggests that the
examiner conformed to agency heuristics without actually examining the
“prime question [of] whether the designation . . . as actually used, will be
recognized in and of itself as an indication of origin.”152
Given that the USPTO does not collect evidence documenting the use of
a mark on the entire scope of goods and services listed in applications,
trademark registrations will often be broader than actual uses in commerce.
Therefore, courts should be especially cautious in deferring to registration
decisions and TTAB conclusions based on the same heuristics for use that are
employed by the examiners. The Gloria Allred “WE THE PEOPLE” example
indicates that administrative shortcuts may afford a mark protection even if no
evidence is presented that the particular mark is used independently of other
symbols appearing on the specimen. Notwithstanding its place on the Principal
Register, a reasonable trier of fact may find that consumers never perceived
“WE THE PEOPLE” to be distinctive of this show, and in any event, could
find that since the show ended in 2012, the mark is no longer in use. 153
Nonetheless, the registration remains live in 2018. Others offering services in
the field of law may seek to use this phrase, and to preserve their right to do
so, courts should be able to engage in de novo review of the facts and
conclusions of law that were quickly made before the registration was issued.

149. See WE THE PEOPLE, Registration No. 4,179,972; WE THE PEOPLE,
Registration No. 4,836,968; WE THE PEOPLE, Registration No. 4,837,090.
150. TMEP § 904.03(i)(B)(1).
151. See id.
152. See MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 7:2.
153. See We the People with Gloria Allred, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1826567/
[https://perma.cc/3GSN-H6VK] (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
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DISTINCTIVENESS HEURISTICS

For a trademark to be protected under the Lanham Act, it must be
“distinctive,” meaning that it must signal to consumers that the product or
service comes from a particular company.154 Every time the USPTO reviews a
trademark application, an examiner must put the proposed mark in one of two
categories: (1) inherently distinctive and, therefore, automatically registrable,
or (2) registrable only if the applicant submits proof that the mark is perceived
as distinctive. A mark may be categorized as “inherently distinctive” if
consumers would immediately recognize it as a brand. A made-up word (like
Mipso for a musical group) would be inherently distinctive because the word
has no meaning apart from referencing its source.155 Other marks must acquire
distinctiveness through use over time.156 In order to protect competitors’ rights
to use words describing their goods and services, marks consisting of
descriptive words (such as American Airlines, Park-N-Fly, or University of
North Carolina) could not be protected until consumers perceived them as
distinctive. Even if they do become marks, the descriptive fair use defense
protects competitive use of the words in descriptive text.157
The better category—for ease of registration—is inherent distinctiveness.
These symbols automatically signal to consumers that they are marks.158 If a
mark is deemed inherently distinctive and is available, it will be admitted to the
Principal Register without any proof of how it is perceived by consumers.159
When an examiner finds that a symbol is not automatically distinctive as a
source identifier, the examiner will require the owner to demonstrate “acquired
distinctiveness” before registration will be permitted. 160 Trademark
applications in this category will be denied registration unless the Applicant
submits evidence of acquired distinctiveness, which is also known as
“secondary meaning.” 161 Collecting direct evidence of trademark meaning
would require the time and effort to obtain consumer testimony or conduct a
survey of consumer reactions to a brand.162
In reviewing trademark applications, examiners classify marks on a
distinctiveness spectrum, often using the rubric set forth in Abercrombie & Fitch
v. Hunting World, Inc.163 Marks that are “fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive” in




154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012).
See MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 11.4.
See id. §§ 11.2, 11.4.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(4).
See MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 11.4.
Id.
Id. § 15.1.
Id.
See id. § 15.30.
537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1976).
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relation to the claimed goods or services will be classified as inherently
distinctive because they are thought to automatically signal brand meaning.164
When an examiner puts a mark in one of these three categories, the USPTO
will automatically register it without any proof of acquired distinctiveness.165
Fanciful marks are those that were invented for the purpose of being a
unique brand, and therefore are thought to clearly convey a trademark message
because they have no other known meaning.166 Examples of fanciful marks
include Pepsi, Xerox, and Claritin.167 They are the platinum standard, created
to convey nothing but trademark significance.168 The second-highest category
on the distinctiveness spectrum are arbitrary marks which use common words
in unexpected ways.169 Examples include “Ivory” for soap and “Apple” for
computers.170 Both fanciful and arbitrary marks are relatively easy to classify
for examiners who may use dictionaries to confirm whether they fit in one of
these two categories.171
Suggestive marks constitute the third category considered inherently
distinctive. These marks evoke a quality of the goods and services without
directly describing them. Suggestive marks sit just above the line of inherent
distinctiveness because they are neither arbitrary nor clearly descriptive.172 One
commonly cited definition of the critical line dividing suggestive from
descriptive marks states that “[a] term is suggestive if it requires imagination,
thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods. A term
is descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients,
qualities or characteristics of the goods.”173 For example, “NIKE” has been

164. MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 11.4 (“Fanciful, arbitrary and suggestive words used
as marks are regarded as being ‘inherently distinctive.’”).
165. Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 11.
166. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2012) (“No trademark by which the goods of the applicant
may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal
register on account of its nature unless it . . . [c]onsists of a mark which (1) when used on or
in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive.”).
167. U.S. Hosiery Corp. v. Gap, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 800, 812 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (providing
“Pepsi” or “Exxon” as examples of “coined, purely fanciful, words”).
168. See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 11.
169. Id. at 10 n.12.
170. See id. at 9 n.6.
171. See, e.g., Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772,
396 F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (VEUVE—meaning WIDOW in French—held to be
“an arbitrary term as applied to champagne and sparkling wine, and thus conceptually strong
as a trademark”).
172. See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 10.
173. Id. at 11 (citing Stix Prods. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
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classified as suggestive for athletic clothing and equipment.174 One who first
saw a product labeled Nike (before it became more famous than its
mythological namesake) would not directly know anything about the product
from the name. Nonetheless, a consumer familiar with the mythological
reference might imagine a product or service that had something to do with
flight, speed, wings, or victory. The category of suggestive marks is notoriously
difficult to define. Even leading trademark commentators concede that this
question of fact is irredeemably subjective.
The next category of symbols sits just below those that are suggestive and
are unified in what they cannot be: inherently distinctive. These marks do not
automatically signal their source but may acquire distinctiveness through
market use that results in consumer brand recognition. The Lanham Act puts
descriptive words, surnames, and truthful geographic references in this
category of marks, for which the applicants must demonstrate
distinctiveness. 175 Marks consisting of a single color (independent of other
design elements or text) and product designs also must have secondary
meaning before they may be registered.176 Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act bars
these marks from the Principal Register unless the applicant proves that the
mark has become distinctive for the claimed goods and services.177
A word mark or design may be classified as descriptive if it references any
feature of the claimed goods and services, such as an ingredient, flavor, quality,
characteristic, function, purpose, or use of the specified goods or services.178
Examples of marks held to be descriptive include: “Frosty Treats” for frozen
desserts,179 “New York Fashion Week” for a week dedicated to fashion shows
in New York City,180 and “Wounded Warrior Project” for a charity dedicated
to wounded veterans.181 Before descriptive words or colors may be registered,
the USPTO requires the applicant to demonstrate that the symbol conveys
brand-specific meaning.

174. Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int’l, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-1468-GEB-JFM, 2007 WL 2782030, at
*7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007) (finding that “NIKE is, at the very least, suggestive”).
175. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), (2), (4) & (f) (2012).
176. See Qualitex Co. v. Johnson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (holding that color can
be registered as a trademark to the extent that it met the ordinary requirements); see also WalMart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (holding that product’s design has to acquire
secondary meaning to prove its distinctiveness).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).
178. See In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that “apple pie” was merely
descriptive of potpourri).
179. See Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir.
2005).
180. See Fashion Week, Inc. v. Council of Fashion Designers of Am., Inc., No.16-cv-5079
(JGK), 2016 WL 4367990 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2016).
181. See WWP, Inc. v. Wounded Warriors, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 2d 970 (D. Neb. 2008).
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The line between suggestive and descriptive marks is “blurry” and so
subjective that decision makers must be careful “to follow something more
objective than a spontaneous, ‘gut-reaction’ test.”182 There is nothing precise
or scientific about this process. If a mark sits on the line between suggestive
and descriptive, the classification decision will be so unpredictable that no two
decision makers can be expected to replicate each other’s results. “[W]hen
almost indistinguishable semantic pigeon-holes are constructed and labelled
‘descriptive’ and ‘suggestive,’ no two human beings, including judges, will place
a given set of marks into the same category.” 183 Consequently, many
descriptive marks will slip through as suggestive and register without any
evidence that they are perceived by consumers as commercially distinctive.
The final category of generic terms and functional features sits just below
the trademark floor and are barred from registration. Generic words may not
be registered at all because they say what a product is, not who sells it.184 Unlike
descriptive words, which may overcome this bar by proof that consumers
perceive the term as distinctive, no amount of consumer recognition can turn
a generic word into a protectable trademark. 185 A combination of generic
words may be found generic and unregistrable if the combination does not
communicate source to consumers. 186 For example, “CloudTV” was held
generic for video services provided over the Internet,187 and “Coffee Flour”
was deemed generic for flour made from coffee beans. 188 The policies of
protecting free expression and promoting fair competition justify the
distinctiveness requirement for registering descriptive terms and the bar
against registering generic terms.
The pivotal classification decision is wholly based on the examiner’s
perception of the symbol and understanding of the market. The “lines of
demarcation” between each category are “not always bright.”189 The examiners
develop expertise in making these decisions, but due to the subjective nature
of the analysis, the limited experience and resources of each examiner, and
ever-expanding new markets, administrative trademark decisions will not

182. MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 11:71.
183. Id. § 11:70.
184. See Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147
(9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he name of the product or service itself—what [the product] is, and as
such . . . the very antithesis of a mark.”).
185. Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1975) (explaining
“that even proof of secondary meaning, by virtue of which some ‘merely descriptive’ marks
may be registered, cannot transform a generic term into a subject for trademark”).
186. See In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
187. See In re ActiveVideo Networks, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1582 (T.T.A.B. 2014).
188. See In re Empire Tech. Dev. LLC, 123 U.S.P.Q.2d 1544 (BNA) (T.T.A.B. 2017).
189. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9.
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always reflect market reality. Words that sit on the border between suggestive
and descriptive, or descriptive and generic, are especially vulnerable to
becoming registered without any evidence that they actually send a distinctive
signal. In order for the USPTO to get these tough decisions made efficiently
and with some consistency across individual examiners, it has developed
heuristics, or short-cuts, that examiners use as proxies for marketplace
evidence.
1.

Availability

Examiners often use availability in the USPTO’s TESS data as a heuristic
for distinctiveness. When a claimed mark consisting of one or more descriptive
words is not on the Principal Register, the examiner may conclude that the
mark is distinctive. When examiners use TESS availability in this way, as a
proxy for distinctiveness, the risks of overprotection and anticompetitive harm
increase. Such risks may be especially salient when the USPTO evaluates
trademark applications for new technologies or products.
For example, the creator of stomp rockets applied to register the name of
its toy which propels a rocket when a child stomps on a launching device.190
The USPTO issued an office action asserting that the word “rocket” was
descriptive and required a disclaimer. No one else had registered the
combination of these two descriptive words. The USPTO permitted “STOMP
ROCKET” to register without proof of secondary meaning.
When Sears and JC Penny tried to sell their own branded stomp rockets,
the owner of the federal trademark registration sued. 191 The district court
deferred to the “facts” set forth in the registration and pushed aside evidence
that “stomp rocket” had become the generic name for this type of toy. The
court grounded its validity analysis on the finding that “the USPTO did not
request from Plaintiff evidence of secondary meaning . . . [and] [s]ignificant
weight must be attached to this registration and this Court must infer that the
USPTO concluded that the marks were, at the least, suggestive.”192 Given that
both words were descriptive of core product features, it is unclear why the
examiner did not require evidence of secondary meaning. Yet, instead of
questioning that initial subjective judgment call, the federal district court
deferred to it and prohibited the competitors from using the words that would
convey to consumers what the product is. The anticompetitive effects of such
decisions can be avoided if courts routinely review the facts de novo rather

190. STOMP ROCKET, Registration. No. 2,221,554 (“[T]oys, namely, flying winged
tubes and structural parts therefor . . . .”).
191. See JFJ Toys, Inc. v. Sears Holdings Corp., 237 F. Supp. 3d 311, 319–20 (D. Md.
2017).
192. Id. at 330 (internal citations omitted).
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than according deference, especially in situations where the examiner’s
decision was not based on evidence but on a subjective call favoring one side
of a blurry line. A proper application of the de novo standard would protect
competitors and consumers against such anticompetitive results.
Dictionaries constitute another source used to determine distinctiveness.
If a word (or combination of words) appears in many TESS marks and in the
dictionary it may be considered descriptive and not distinctive. Unfortunately,
examiners may also conclude that the opposite is true and use absence in a
dictionary as a heuristic for inherent distinctiveness. If a word does not appear
in a dictionary, it may be found to pass the “dictionary test” and be deemed
not descriptive.193 However, new words and combinations of words should be
evaluated for distinctiveness even if they do not yet appear in dictionaries. The
absence of a word in a dictionary or a definition that includes only a term’s
trademark meaning may indicate that the term has not yet been vetted by
lexicographers or that an entry was altered or deleted after the dictionary’s
publisher received a cease and desist letter.194 Third party registrations that
include the term in question may also be used as a heuristic for
nondescriptiveness.195
The STOMP ROCKET example illustrates how the availability heuristic
can make an examiner’s job easier, but can interfere with market competition
later.196 If a word mark does not fail any of the typical tests by appearing in a
dictionary or descriptive text used by the applicant or competitors, the
consequential impression of availability becomes a heuristic to support

193.
[T]he dictionary definition of the word is an appropriate and relevant
indication ‘of the ordinary significance and meaning of words’ to the public
. . . . A third test used by courts and commentators to classify descriptive
marks is “whether competitors would be likely to need the terms used in
the trademark in describing their products.
See Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 792–93 (5th Cir. 1983). A
descriptive term generally relates so closely and directly to a product or service that other
merchants marketing similar goods would find the term useful in identifying their own goods.
194. Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in Trademarks, 88 N.C. L. REV. 427, 494–
99 (2010).
195. See MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 11.20. (“Third party mark registrations may in
some cases support the argument that a designation is not descriptive. The fact that the
USPTO. registered a number of marks containing the same designation without requiring
proof of secondary meaning is some evidence that the PTO considers the designation not
descriptive.”).
196. JFJ Toys, Inc. v. Sears Holdings Corp., 237 F. Supp. 3d 311, 333(D. Md. 2017).
(finding that the claim “Stomp Rocket” had become generic was undermined by the fact that
the words did not appear together in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary).
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nondescriptiveness.197
Words that describe the product or its purpose should be classified as
descriptive and require proof of distinctiveness to qualify for trademark
registration. But multiple heuristics permit marks to register with
circumstantial evidence of distinctiveness or no evidence at all. USPTO
examiners should remember the Supreme Court’s directive that, in close calls,
one should err on the side of requiring proof of distinctiveness.198 When the
examiner makes a call in favor of inherent distinctiveness, a symbol may
immediately, albeit incorrectly, obtain the presumption of validity afforded to
marks on the Principal Register. De novo review would preserve the
opportunity to correct such results.
2.

Incontestability

The automatic ripening from registration to incontestability compounds
the risks of overprotecting marks that are not factually defensible as distinctive
source identifiers. While the registration ages, the term may not become more
distinctive. Nonetheless, if renewed, the registration will automatically become
incontestable and more difficult to undo. Marks that obtain registration are
immediately cloaked with a statutory presumption of validity. A USPTO
decision to “register a mark without requiring proof of secondary meaning
affords a rebuttable presumption that the mark is suggestive or arbitrary or
fanciful rather than merely descriptive.”199 New evidence may be necessary to
undo a registration decision, even one made based on incomplete, subjective,
or faulty assumptions.
After five years, if the mark owner reapplies for registration, the mark will
automatically become “incontestable” and can no longer be cancelled on the
basis of being merely descriptive. 200 Incontestability provides a heightened
presumption of validity over other registrations. The Lanham Act provides
that incontestability is “conclusive evidence of the validity of . . . the
registrant’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce.” 201
Therefore, a mark’s presence on the Principal Register becomes an
administrative heuristic for evidence of distinctiveness even if no evidence was

197. See, e.g., Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. Ryan, CIV. A. 89-5574-R., 1989 WL 167604, at *3
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 1989) (“MUSICSOFT can be considered an arbitrary mark since it is not
found in any English dictionary.”).
198. See Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000) (stating in the trade
dress context, that in “close cases, we believe that courts should err on the side of caution and
. . . thereby requiring secondary meaning”).
199. Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1975).
200. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(b) (2012).
201. Id. § 1115(b).
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ever put before the USPTO.202
In a study of trademark incontestability, Professor Rebecca Tushnet
concluded that “no one should be made better off by providing inaccurate
information to the PTO. Unfortunately, it is currently possible to benefit from
doing so.” 203 Despite the power and strength incontestability confers, no
substantive examination occurs at this point in the registration process.204 An
affidavit containing the required information and attesting to a claim of
continuous use is all that is required, and the heightened status is conferred
automatically.205 “Incontestability’s main bite is in preventing any challenge to
the registration on the grounds that the mark lacks secondary meaning . . . .”206
Once incontestable status has been achieved, a competitor may only use
the word if it can establish that the mark is generic or that its use falls under a
fair use defense.207 Both strategies may involve expensive litigation.208 If courts
review USPTO classification decisions de novo, a competitor who wants to
fight for the opportunity to use descriptive words will have some avenue to
assert such a claim. The Lanham Act permits courts to question
incontestability decisions,209 and given the heuristics used in the registration
process, they should not hesitate to do so.
To ensure fair competition and free expression in the use of descriptive
words, the federal judiciary should not give up their authority on this issue.
Judges should also use their power to order corrections to the Principal
Register in appropriate circumstances. For example, a district court narrowed

202. Tushnet, supra note 92, at 435–36.
203. Tushnet, supra note 92, at 455.
204. See id. at 436, 450; MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 19:140; TMEP § 1605.
205. Tushnet, supra note 92, at 440–46 (documenting clear errors in USPTO conferring
incontestable status).
206. Id. at 438.
207. The Lanham Act limits trademark rights in descriptive terms. In addition to being
more difficult to obtain, these trademarks are more difficult to enforce. They are subject to
the descriptive fair use defense defined in the Lanham Act as “use of the name, term, or device
charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark . . . of a term or device which
is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of
such party, or their geographic origin.” 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012). KP Permanent MakeUp, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122 (2004) (holding that “the common
law’s tolerance of a certain degree of confusion on the part of consumers followed from the
very fact that in cases like this one an originally descriptive term was selected to be used as a
mark, not to mention the undesirability of allowing anyone to obtain a complete monopoly
on use of a descriptive term simply by grabbing it first”).
208. See Tushnet, supra note 92, at 439.
209. See id. at 450 (quoting Fed. Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v. Spirits Int’l. N.V., 623 F.3d
61, 63 (2d Cir. 2010) and asserting that an incontestable registration “does not prevent courts
from asking whether a claimant is in fact entitled to its benefit”).
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Louboutin’s registration of a red undersole for shoes. 210 In its application,
Louboutin claimed the exclusive right to use red on the undersole of shoes,
irrespective of the color of other portions of the shoe.211 It sued Yves Saint
Laurent, not for providing a similar contrasting pop of red, but for an entirely
red shoe. 212 After evaluating the evidence, the district court ordered the
USPTO to narrow the registration to situations where Louboutin actually had
proof of distinctiveness: an undersole that contrasted with the upper portions
of the shoe.213 Litigants who go to the trouble of obtaining such relief in federal
courts should remember to petition the USPTO to cancel or narrow the
registration. As the SEALTIGHT saga demonstrates, if they do not, they may
later be stuck with results based on the Principal Register and lose all that was
gained in litigation.214
C.

LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION HEURISTICS

In addition to use and distinctiveness, the USPTO must also determine
whether a symbol is confusingly similar to any previously registered marks. If
so, section 2(d) of the Lanham Act bars registration. 215 Two-thirds of all
applications must overcome at least one USPTO office action, and “likelihood
of confusion” is the most common basis asserted. When a new entrant
responds that the cited mark is no longer in use, the USPTO will generally
treat evidence of actual market use as irrelevant. A junior user may claim that
a senior mark owner has abandoned its mark, and therefore the junior user’s
mark should be registered. This argument could win in court, but it will always
fail before the USPTO because trademark examiners cannot consider evidence
that market use does not match claims made in existing registrations.216 When
new entrants assert that a mark is not actually in use as claimed in a prior
registration, examiners respond with the following standard text, “[w]ith

210. See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206
(2d Cir. 2012).
211. See id. at 213.
212. Id.
213. The mark consists of a red lacquered outsole on footwear that contrasts with the
color of the adjoining (“upper”) portion of the shoe, Registration No. 3,361,597.
214. See supra notes 88–101 and accompanying text.
215. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012):
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished
from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal
register on account of its nature unless it . . . [c]onsists of or comprises a
mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark
Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by
another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection
with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive.
216. See TMEP § 1207.01(a)(iii).
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respect to applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services, the question of
likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the goods
and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on
extrinsic evidence of actual use.”217
There are, of course, many good reasons why the USPTO treats claims in
registrations as presumptively valid. The Lanham Act requires them to do so.
The presumption of validity protects the rights of mark owners who are not
parties to pre-publication application proceedings, and therefore, are not
present to defend their intellectual property. Any mark on the Principal or
Supplemental Registers may be cited in an office action as evidence of a prior
mark that should bar a new mark that is confusingly similar. These proceedings
involve only the USPTO and the applicant. The owners of the cited marks are
not present to defend attacks against the facts stated in their mark’s federal
registration.218 In registration proceedings, due process concerns prevent new
entrants from challenging current registrations with marketplace evidence that
would be used in court. The trademark registration system has two
mechanisms available to mark owners who think their trademark rights might
be harmed by a new entrant. If the USPTO permits the applicant’s mark to
publish or register, those harmed by such a decision may later challenge it
through a post publication opposition or post registration cancellation
proceeding.219
The unfortunate consequence of this practice is that it burdens new
entrants with the necessity of clearing the deadwood from the Principal
Register. They must file separate cancellation proceedings against each cited
mark in order to challenge the breadth of goods and services or continued use
of the cited registrations. Each of these proceedings would be time-consuming
and expensive. A more efficient practice would require the mark owners to
submit proof of continued use to the USPTO if a new entrant provides
evidence of abandonment.
Federal courts should be mindful of the limited likelihood of confusion
analysis that happens at the USPTO. In determining whether a mark is

217. Office Action (Official Letter), U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, About Applicant’s
Trademark Application, U.S. Application Serial No. 86,124,578 (Apr. 2, 2014 5:43:50 PM); see
Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
TMEP § 1207.01(a)(iii) (“The nature and scope of a party’s goods or services must be
determined on the basis of the goods or services recited in the application or registration.”).
218. See Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 854, 865 (S.D. Ind. 2003),
aff’d, 357 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Honeywell’s request to defer to the TTAB’s
decision because “the TTAB made its decision in an ex parte proceeding, without the benefit
of a true adversary who had a strong incentive to present—and the ability to find—evidence
that would have undermined Honeywell’s arguments”).
219. TMEP §§ 1503.03, 1607.
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available, the USPTO relies on its registry instead of actual use in commerce.
Accordingly, federal courts should remember that many “likelihood of
confusion” decisions made by the USPTO are not based on evidence of
market use. Instead, the USPTO uses bare allegations from the Principal
Register that, when audited, often cannot be substantiated.220
In an ex parte registration proceeding, the USPTO and the TTAB do not
have the authority to limit or cancel third-party marks that are not used as
stated on the Principal Register. In trademark infringement cases, federal
courts do have that authority and, as a result, should not defer to administrative
decisions by the USPTO or TTAB which lack such powers. Section 37 of the
Lanham Act empowers federal courts to cancel all or part of a trademark
registration when evidence indicates that a symbol has become generic. 221
When federal courts use this power, they ensure that administrative heuristics
do not undermine the foundational trademark policy of supporting fair
competition by assuring that no one can maintain a monopoly on a mark that
is no longer in use.222
V.

THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF TRADEMARKS PROVIDES
AN ADDITIONAL REASON TO AVOID DEFERENCE

The dynamic nature of trademarks is another reason why federal courts
should avoid deferring to the USPTO. Trademark rights expand and contract
as a function of constantly changing market dynamics. In stark contrast, other
forms of intellectual property have neatly ordered lives. They are created; they
last for a set term of years, and then they expire, permitting the underlying
work to enter the public domain. A copyright term begins when original
expression is fixed and generally lasts for the author’s life plus seventy years.223
When it expires, the work enters the public domain.224 Utility patents have a

220. See supra notes 88–101 and accompanying text.
221. See 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2012).
222. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97, (1918) (holding
that “[t]here is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an
established business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed. The law of
trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition; the right to a particular
mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption; its function is simply to designate the
goods as the product of a particular trader and to protect his good will against the sale of
another’s product as his; and it is not the subject of property except in connection with an
existing business”).
223. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 302–305 (2012) (providing that contemporary copyrights endure
for the “life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death” or for works made for hire,
“the copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term
of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first”).
224. See id. §§ 302–305.
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similar linear life that is generally limited to twenty years from the date of
application if the USPTO ultimately finds that the invention is patentable.225
Both patent and trade secret protection may be foreclosed by public
disclosures made in the patent application process. When a patent application
is denied, the claimed invention enters the public domain.226 Rights of publicity
generally expire when the celebrity dies or within a term of years afterwards.227
Once these fixed intellectual property terms end, the names, expressive works,
and inventions enter the public domain and become freely available for public
use unless they also infringe a trademark right.
Trademarks are different. They begin with use in commerce, not creation
or a federal grant of exclusivity.228 Trademarks do not need to be novel or
original to merit protection. Unlike patents, copyrights, and rights of publicity,
trademarks have no set expiration date.229 If carefully tended, they can last
forever.230 Rather than decreasing in value over time as a work gets close to
entering the public domain, trademark strength can increase indefinitely. A
long history of use is one metric thought to support a mark’s strength.231 If
well curated, trademark rights may become more robust over time and last
forever.232
Like other forms of intellectual property, trademarks are still vulnerable to
challenges. The Lanham Act expressly provides for the possibility of a

225. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (providing that utility patents are in effect “for a term
beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which
the application for the patent was filed in the United States”).
226. See id. § 102(a) (providing that a “person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the
claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale,
or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention
. . .”); see also Rototron Corp. v. Lake Shore Burial Vault Co., 712 F.2d 1214, 1215 (7th Cir.
1983) (stating that because the issuance of a patent allowed knowledge to pass into the public
domain a patent signified public disclosure and precluded trade secret protection); Scharmer
v. Carrollton Mfg. Co., 525 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that a patent constitutes public
disclosure after which any “property right in a trade secret” is extinguished).
227. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 2012) (right of publicity claims may “not be
brought under this section by reason of any use of a deceased personality’s name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness occurring after the expiration of 70 years after the death of
the deceased personality”).
228. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (2012); 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–305 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 154.
229. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058; 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–305; 35 U.S.C. § 154.
230. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058.
231. See In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d 539, 543 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (noting that
unlike patent law, “trademark law . . . provides for the grant of rights to the trademark owner
for an indefinite time period”).
232. See Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(“Trademark rights last for an indefinite period, depending on the strength and duration of
the public’s recognition that the mark identifies the producer’s goods.”); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058,
1059.
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registered mark to lose its protection at “any time.” 233 Notwithstanding the
strong presumption of validity for all registered marks, they are all subject to
cancellation.234 Federal registrations will expire if the owner does not file an
affidavit alleging continued use at each renewal interval and may be cancelled
for a number of additional reasons. 235 Marks that have not achieved
incontestable status (those in the first five years of their registered life) may
also be challenged for any reason listed in Section 2 of the Lanham Act, such
as the claim that a mark is merely descriptive and has not acquired secondary
meaning. 236 Although the Lanham Act provides that an incontestable
registration is “conclusive evidence” of the facts in a registration certificate,
even these registrations may be cancelled if the mark is abandoned, becomes
generic or functional, or if the registration was obtained fraudulently.237 Failure
to use a mark for three years without an intent to resume use constitutes prima
facie evidence of abandonment.238 A registration may also be cancelled if the
applicant made fraudulent claims in its application.239
Word marks that were once distinctive sometimes become the generic
name for a product, and then can no longer maintain a place on the Register.240
The Lanham Act classifies this cessation of rights as abandonment, even
though the loss may be caused as much by competitors and consumers as the
mark owners themselves.241 If a word answers the question “What are you?” it
has become the generic name of a product and may not be protected as a
mark.242 If, however, the word answers the questions “Who are you?” or “Who
vouches for you?” it may be protected as a trademark.243 Examples of marks
that were once federally registered but were cancelled by a federal court on the
basis that they became generic include “YO-YO,” “ASPIRIN,”

233. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (providing that a registration may be cancelled “[a]t any time if
the registered mark becomes the generic name for the goods or services”).
234. See id.
235. See id. § 1059.
236. Id. § 1064.
237. Id.
238. Id. § 1127.
239. Id. § 1064.
240. See id.; Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 611 F.2d 296, 304 (9th Cir. 1979)
(“If the primary significance of the trademark is to describe the type of product rather than
the producer, the trademark has become a generic term and is no longer a valid trademark.”).
241. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (“The primary significance of the registered mark to the
relevant public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the
registered mark has become the generic name . . . .”).
242. Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th
Cir. 1999).
243. Id.
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“ESCALATOR,” “TRAMPOLINE,” and “SUPER GLUE.”244
In addition to words, trademark registrations also extend to a category of
nontextual symbols or trade dress245 which includes product packaging (like
the Coca-Cola bottle), product design (the shape of a Ferrari car), and colors
(like Tiffany’s robin’s egg blue). 246 Registrations for trade dress may be
cancelled at any time if a challenger proves that the symbol is functional.247
While some courts have held that such a loss is irreversible no matter how
much secondary meaning a generic or functional symbol acquires, others have
found that marks that have lost protection for being functional may regain
protection if the symbol’s owner proves that the mark is no longer functional
and has reacquired commercial distinctiveness.248
The scope of trademark rights is also malleable. Copyright and patent
protection are limited to the work or invention identified in the application,
and federal law expressly prohibits expansion of the right beyond that initial
scope.249 Trademark rights are different in that they may expand or contract as

244. See Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655, 668 (7th Cir. 1965)
(holding that “yo-yo” is no longer a valid trademark); Bayer v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505,
515–16 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (allowing competitor to market its drug under the term “Aspirin” to
the public since the word had already entered into public domain); Haughton Elevator Co. v.
Seeberger, 40 Trademark Rep. 326, 326–27 (1950) (cancelling 50-year-old registration for
“escalator”); Loctite Corp. v. Nat’l Starch & Chem. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 190, 217–19 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (cancelling supplemental registration because the term “Super Glue” was used and
understood as a term that was generic); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Am. Trampoline Co., 193
F. Supp. 745, 755–56 (S.D. Iowa 1961) (holding that the term “trampoline” is “generic and in
the public domain and cannot be exclusively appropriated for trademark usage”).
245. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764 n.1 (1992) (explaining
that the “‘trade dress’ of a product is essentially its total image and overall appearance . . . [it]
involves the total image of a product and may include features such as size, shape, color or
color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques”) (citations omitted).
246. The trademark consists of the distinctively shaped contour, Registration No.
72,069,873; the mark consists of the configuration of an automobile, Registration No.
3,743,490; TIFFANY BLUE, Registration No. 4,804,204.
247. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 23 (2001) (“Trade dress
can be protected under federal law, but the person asserting such protection in an infringement
action must prove that the matter sought to be protected is not functional.”); see also Sweet St.
Desserts, Inc. v. Chudleigh’s Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 3d 530, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“A registered
trademark is always subject to cancellation as functional.”).
248. See, e.g., Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 357 F.3d 649, 653 (interpreting
TrafFix to support the contention that “what was once functional may half a century later be
ornamental”).
249. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2012) (“The copyright in a compilation or derivative work
extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the
preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the
preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or
enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the
preexisting material.”); 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2012) (stating that any proposed amendment or new
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a function of use in commerce. Nothing in the Lanham Act prevents a mark
owner from applying for additional registrations on a previously owned mark
if it expands its use to new products or services not previously claimed. The
Lanham Act also permits federal trademark registrations to be cancelled or
narrowed if a mark owner abandons the mark or continues to use it in
connection with only a subset of the goods or services identified in the existing
registration.250
As noted above, many forms of intellectual property rights last for a fixed
number of years, and once the term of protection ends, the right cannot be
recovered.251 Trademarks are different because they can expand or contract, or
lost and then reacquired. If a mark is denied registration because it lacks
secondary meaning, the applicant may later obtain registration for the same
mark if he or she can provide the USPTO with evidence of distinctive use in
commerce. Applicants whose registrations were rejected for being confusingly
similar to a senior mark may also reapply and obtain a registration if the senior
user’s registration lapses.252
Trademarks are also the only form of intellectual property that can die and
be revived. They are like zombies: any abandoned trademark can be
resuscitated through use, take on a new life, and become stronger than it ever
was before. An administrative pronouncement of death does not mean that
the trademark cannot rise again.
The dynamic nature of trademarks as symbols and the forward-looking
nature of the likelihood of confusion standard means that a decision that might
have made sense at one time can and will be revisited if it is relitigated later.
The likelihood of confusion analysis involves consideration of at least eight
factual variables. 253 It is a predictive standard designed to assess future

claim that attempts to enlarge the preexisting patent is prohibited under ex parte review); 35
U.S.C. § 316(d)(3) (forbidding enlargement of the patent under inter partes review); 5 U.S.C.
§ 326(d)(3) (2012) (forbidding enlargement of the patent under post-grant review).
250. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064.
251. 35 U.S.C. § 154. Before 1989, copyrights could also be lost by publication without
the requisite notice. See Deborah R. Gerhardt, Copyright Publication: An Empirical Study, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 141 (2011).
252. 15 U.S.C. § 1095.
253.
Where the products are different, the prior owner’s chance of success is a
function of many variables: the strength of his mark, the degree of similarity
between the two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that
the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of
defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s
product, and the sophistication of the buyers. Even this extensive catalogue
does not exhaust the possibilities—the court may have to take still other
variables into account.
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consumer perceptions based on the status quo. Because the likelihood of
confusion standard is applied to the changing symbols of at least two
organizations, the factual grounding for the analysis is constantly shifting.
While the symbols themselves may remain the same, as the evidence of market
use changes, the predictive likelihood of confusion standard may yield results
that differ substantially from a past decision. Consequently, as the
SEALTIGHT saga illustrates, the same two parties may relitigate infringement
questions involving the same two symbols, as their markets and consumer
understandings evolve. 254 Given the multitude of trademark variables that
change over time, deference to any past decision can be problematic.
The next Part turns to yet another reason why de novo review of trademark
matters is appropriate. Deference is not accorded when agencies interpret
provisions, like the United States Constitution, that are outside the scope of
the agency’s specialized administrative responsibility. 255 Due to the many
expressive interests at issue in trademark matters, judicial decisions should be
informed by expertise outside the field of trademark law.
VI.

TRADEMARK EXPERTISE CAN CREATE AN ECHO
CHAMBER THAT DROWNS OUT OTHER
RELEVANT MODES OF INQUIRY

When anyone is faced with a decision outside one’s area of expertise,
deference to an expert is a sensible instinct. Deference to the USPTO on
trademark matters may be especially tempting given the agency’s expertise in
trademark law. But before such deference is accorded, it makes sense to
examine whether the USPTO or federal courts are institutionally better
situated to decide fact-intensive trademark questions.
Another important question to consider is whether the USPTO is best
suited to analyze trademark matters that implicate important legal issues
outside trademark law. When experts analyze the world through a particular
paradigm, they may not be as open to other modes of inquiry. For this reason,
great trademark expertise in the USPTO could result in a trademark echo
chamber where trademark ideas drown out other important doctrines that
intersect with this economic and expressive area of law. Given the heuristics
outlined above, a federal court may be the only forum where a trademark
litigant has a genuine shot of introducing evidence and expertise from other

Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
254. See supra notes 88–101 and accompanying text.
255. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ametek, Inc., 104 F.3d 558, 562 (3d Cir. 1997); Scheduled
Airlines Traffic Offices, Inc. v. Department of Defense, 87 F.3d 1356, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N. Carolina v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 917 F.2d 812, 816 (4th
Cir. 1990).


2018]

BEWARE THE TRADEMARK ECHO CHAMBER

685

fields like behavioral economics and lexicography.
De novo judicial review of USPTO decisions is also necessary to protect
expressive interests that are embodied in trademark symbols but grounded in
doctrine outside trademark law, such as the constitutional guarantee of free
expression. The contrasting USPTO and judicial analysis of “THE SLANTS”
mark illustrates how trademark registration decisions may change when other
modes of inquiry, such as First Amendment analysis, are considered in addition
to trademark law. The dispute arose when Simon Shiao Tam applied to register
“THE SLANTS” for his electronic music band. The examiner would not
permit the mark to register on the ground that it violated section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act, which, before it was held unconstitutional, barred the registration
of any mark “which may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions,
beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”256 The
TTAB affirmed the examiner’s decision. Tam appealed to the Federal Circuit,
arguing that the TTAB erred in finding his mark disparaging and that, in any
event, section 2(a) is unconstitutional.257
Instead of deferring to the TTAB on its trademark analysis and resting its
affirmance on trademark law alone, the Federal Circuit met en banc to examine
how trademark law fits within the larger structure of constitutional law
governing free speech. Decades earlier, the Federal Circuit held that refusal to
register a mark did not violate First Amendment rights because the Applicant
could continue to use the mark.258 In considering “THE SLANTS,” the en
banc panel reconsidered this precedent and conducted a de novo review of the
record. After doing so, it concluded that the Lanham Act’s disparagement bar
is unconstitutional.259 The Supreme Court affirmed and noted that free speech
issues are often implicated in trademark decisions. It stated that,
[T]rademarks often have an expressive content. Companies spend
huge amounts to create and publicize trademarks that convey a
message. It is true that the necessary brevity of trademarks limits what
they can say. But powerful messages can sometimes be conveyed in
just a few words.260



256. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1753 (2017).
257. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
258. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981), overruled by 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (concluding that “it is clear that the PTO’s refusal to register appellant’s mark does
not affect his right to use it. No conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of expression is
suppressed. Consequently, appellant’s First Amendment rights would not be abridged by the
refusal to register his mark”) (internal citations omitted).
259. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1765.
260. Id. at 1760.
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If the Federal Circuit had deferred to the TTAB, it might never have
reached the constitutional question that led to the invalidation of the
disparagement clause of section 2(a). Instead, the Federal Circuit recognized
that significant expressive issues were at stake and chose not to defer to the
TTAB’s conclusions based only on trademark doctrine.
Although the speech in Tam has cultural and political connotations not
shared by all marks, it is not necessarily atypical. Every trademark carries with
it some expressive value.261 If it did not, it could not function as a distinctive
source identifier. Trademark professionals work hard to link brands to specific
ideas.262 Many contemporary marks signify meaningful values that can be used
to prompt political or cultural change.263
The USPTO is not empowered to decide questions of constitutional law.264
After Tam was decided, the USPTO continued to conduct business as usual
within its sphere of expertise and jurisdiction. It does not have the power to
apply the reasoning in Tam to invalidate other provisions of the Lanham Act.
Accordingly, the USPTO continued to treat other provisions of Section 2(a)
that raise similar constitutional questions as valid. In addition to disparaging
marks, Section 2(a) indicates that one may not register immoral or scandalous
marks. The Lanham Act does not define these subjective terms, and as one
might expect, two empirical studies found that they were routinely applied
inconsistently.265
Even after Tam was decided, the USPTO continued to bar registration
based on the Section 2(a) scandalous and immoral bar. This practice continued
until the Federal Circuit decided In re Brunetti, in which an applicant sought to
register “FUCT” for clothing.266 The examiner found that Section 2(a) barred
the mark’s registration, and the TTAB affirmed, noting that its decision was

261. See id. at 1752, 1760 (“The foundation of current federal trademark law is the Lanham
Act, enacted in 1946 . . . By that time, trademark had expanded far beyond phrases that do no
more than identify a good or service. Then, as now, trademarks often consisted of catchy
phrases that convey a message.”).
262. See NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO 21 (2009) (explaining that in the late twentieth century,
“a new consensus was born: the products that will flourish in the future will be the one
presented not as commodities but as concepts: the brand as experience, as lifestyle”).
263. See generally Deborah R. Gerhardt, Trademarks as Entrepreneurial Change Agents for Legal
Reform, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1519 (2017).
264. See In re Brunetti, Serial No. 85310960, 2014 WL 3976439, at *5 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 1,
2014) (“It is abundantly clear that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board is not the appropriate
forum for re-evaluating . . . First Amendment jurisprudence . . . .”).
265. See Meghan M. Carpenter & Mary Garner, NSFW: An Empirical Study of Scandalous
Trademarks, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321, 356–61 (2015); Anne Gilson LaLonde &
Jerome Gilson, Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks That May Be Scandalous or Immoral, 101
TRADEMARK REP. 1476, 1478–82 (2011).
266. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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founded on trademark law, not constitutional issues:
It is abundantly clear that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board is
not the appropriate forum for re-evaluating the impacts of any
evolving First Amendment jurisprudence within Article III courts
upon determinations under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, or for
answering the Constitutional arguments of legal commentators or
blog critics.267

Instead of using a deferential rubber stamp, the Federal Circuit reviewed the
matter de novo and held that based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Tam,
the Section 2(a) bar against immoral or scandalous marks violated the First
Amendment.268
While USPTO expertise may result in a high level of competence with
respect to trademark law, the specialization of trademark experts and the
USPTO’s limited jurisdiction are additional reasons not to defer to the
USPTO. While market and expressive concerns are frequently at issue in
trademark matters, USPTO examiners and TTAB judges have no special
expertise in either field. The USPTO policy office is staffed with trademark
professionals, and not economists, lexicographers, behavioral economists, or
other business professionals. Examiners and TTAB judges assess trademark
applications against USPTO TESS data that, by the USPTO’s own admission,
cannot often be supported by current marketplace evidence.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Although there is some confusion as to the level of deference federal
courts should apply in reviewing USPTO trademark decisions, many are
correctly applying de novo review. That trend should be solidified as a
common practice. Too much deference could result in decisions from a
trademark echo chamber. The USPTO routinely makes registration decisions
on the fact-intensive questions of availability, validity, and distinctiveness, but
cannot spend the amount of time that federal courts spend when making
findings of fact. In determining the appropriate level of deference, federal
courts should remember that USPTO examiners generally move through
applications quickly and apply multiple heuristics as a stand-in for evidence of
market use. The USPTO’s pilot audit of the Principal Register demonstrated
that half of the audited registrations contained assertions that could not be
supported with evidence.



267. In re Brunetti, No. 85310960, 2014 WL 3976439, at *5 (Aug. 1, 2014).
268. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1357.
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Because trademarks are dynamic, they change constantly as markets adjust
to new consumer demands and understandings. Courts should hesitate to
defer to past trademark decisions, because a trademark decision made based
on yesterday’s market facts may require reconsideration if the question arises
in a changed market context. Finally, while the USPTO does have significant
trademark expertise, its own TTAB judges admit that they make decisions
within their trademark paradigm and do not view their role as permitting
review of overlapping doctrinal issues, such as First Amendment protections.
For all of these reasons, federal judges should apply de novo review of USPTO
trademark decisions so that, if necessary, they can be fully adjudicated in court
where market evidence and multiple modes of inquiry can inform the final
decision.



